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Introduction
The idea of co-opting rebels with economic incentives has become increasingly popular in theory 1 and practice. 2 At a time when insurgency is more often framed as a criminal business network than a revolutionary enterprise, 3 the underlying logic of altering the cost-benefit calculus of rebels in favour of peace by overriding political grievances with economic opportunities seems appealing.
To inquire into the application or non-application of this logic, Myanmar makes for an interesting case to study. Since the failure of a post-independence settlement between the country's ethnic minorities and its ethnic majority, several dozen armed ethno-nationalist insurgencies have been fighting for more autonomy or outright secession from Myanmar's central government. 4 For more than two decades the country's army sought to pacify many of these insurrections by negotiating separate ceasefire agreements with individual armed groups. While these armistices did not lead to substantial political dialogue, they allowed insurgents to retain their arms and govern pockets of territory. 5 Moreover, these pacts encouraged armed group involvement in what has been referred to as the country's 'ceasefire capitalism' 6 : the collaborative exploitation of the area's natural riches by army generals, rebel leaders and Chinese businessmen. As the co-optation of rebels by way of economic incentives, indeed, produced remarkably stable settlements for many years, some authors have referred to Myanmar as a twist to the conventional 'resource curse' narrative. 7 Instead of fuelling violent conflict over lootable resources, the country's ceasefire politics seemed to demonstrate that 'economic self-interest can also move combatants to cease hostilities' . 8 One of the oldest and strongest ethnic armed groups in Myanmar-the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)-agreed to a ceasefire in 1994. As Nicolas Farelly points out, this pact had been 'integral to the security of northern Burma' for 17 years. 9 In 2011, however fighting between Myanmar's armed forces-the Tatmadaw-and the KIO escalated again. Since then the rugged Kachin hills bordering China have once more been embroiled in deadly conflict, resulting in heavy losses on both sides and displacing up to 100,000 civilians. 10 This was particularly puzzling as the revolutionary ambitions and military capacities of the KIO seemed to have withered away over the long ceasefire years, while its leaders profited from the spoils of the ceasefire economies. During these years, they also established intimate ties with Tatmadaw commanders and were relatively accommodating towards the government. 11 Since war broke out again the Kachin This article argues that attempts to co-opt rebel leaders into peace with lucrative business concessions have backfired. While economic counter-insurgency has worked to curb armed conflict for many years, it left underlying grievances unaddressed and planted the seeds of new ones among local communities and among the rank and file of the KIO.
These new resentments were not only directed against the Myanmar government, but primarily against the leadership of the KIO itself. This has undermined the legitimacy of KIO leaders and ultimately provided a fertile mobilisation ground for an emerging faction of young officers to take over leadership and refute their organisation's conciliatory stance.
To capture these processes it is necessary to analyse the interaction between differently situated and motivated elite and mass-level actors of insurgency, which produce multifaceted and shifting landscapes of power and legitimacy that develop a momentum of their own in influencing armed group behaviour. This within-group perspective helps to explain why elite settlements that initially appear successful can be highly unstable in the long run.
To present these findings, the article will first review the situation of the KIO ceasefire against the background of economic counter-insurgency in Myanmar. It will then discuss the assumptions underlying such economistic engagement of armed groups as well as its pitfalls. Building on recent scholarship, 13 the article proposes to shift the focus towards the internal politics of insurgency. It uses analytical insights and findings from nine months of field research to explain how economic counter-insurgency affected cohesion, legitimacy and contestation within the KIO and ultimately backfired.
'Monetary ammunition' in Kachin State
Counter-insurgency doctrine has seen a rapid revival, since US troops became embroiled in battling capable insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The US military learned from Vietnam that defeating insurgency is not a purely military exercise but that '"a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our non-military efforts'. 14 
When distilling his lessons from Iraq, US counter-insurgency mastermind Lt Gen David
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Petraeus stressed the importance of economic strategies to counter rebellion, stating that:
'Money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition'. 15 To many insurgents in Myanmar, his words sound familiar. This was expressed by a high-ranking officer of the Karen National Union (KNU)-the country's longest running ethnic insurgency-in an interview about the movement's current ceasefire with Naypyidaw: 'They carry money. They don't carry guns, they don't carry bullets'. 16 After meeting with KNU leaders, Myanmar's chief peace negotiator U Aung Min reportedly postulated that if 'they become rich, no one will want to hold arms. 30 Outside observers also highlighted the importance of economic incentives that made the armistice additionally palatable to individual rebel leaders. 31 The government
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Subsequently it became one of the most accommodating ceasefire groups, whose leaders then seemed more interested in plundering their territories together with Tatmadaw generals and Chinese businessmen than in waging revolutionary war. 33 According to a foreign diplomat in Yangon at the time, the KIO was formerly regarded as one of the 'good' ethnic armed groups that had not colluded with the Tatmadaw. With its increasing business activities after the ceasefire, however, the KIO increasingly came to be identified with the 'bad' armed groups mostly associated with running illicit businesses along the Myanmar -China border. 34 Since the sudden breakdown of the 17-year-long ceasefire in June 2011, however, the KIO has defied this role of rebels-turned-businessmen. Instead the movement has since proven willing to fight again, spearheading a camp of ethnic armed groups that are least willing to compromise with Naypyidaw at the negotiation table. 35 These shifting realities first surfaced in 2008 at a time of heightened tension. In an attempt to exert tighter control over ceasefire groups, Naypyidaw demanded that the various armed groups transform themselves into so-called Border Guard Forces (BGFs). This project aimed to legalise armed groups as militias in return for their subordination under Tatmadaw command.
Moreover, it was meant to minimise their political ambitions by offering the registration of political ethnic minority parties instead, which were promised to compete in future election campaigns. 36 After long years of ceasefires and militarised state-building-which significantly reduced the strength of most ethnic armies-Myanmar's generals seemed to have finally concluded that they had tipped the balance of forces in their favour and were determined to bring the country's borderlands under more direct control. 37 Many of the old KIO elite-who had ensured the movement's conciliatory stance for many years-were inclined to give in to this demand. Some of them had previously taken part in other government initiatives, including the National Convention process in 2003, which was tasked with drafting the country's 2008 constitution. 38 In their opinion, submitting their armed wing to government control and establishing a political party was better than risking a return to armed conflict. 39 Yet, the BGF issue brought an internal struggle for leadership to the fore. A faction of young officers vehemently opposed the Tatmadaw's demand, viewing it as the potential 'deathblow to the KIO' . 40 This grouping eventually managed to take over leadership within 
The pitfalls of economic counter-insurgency
The idea of buying insurgents out of violence-as put forward by some scholars of conflict resolution 43 -dovetails with an understanding of civil wars that views economic profiteering rather than ideology or political grievances as the main driving force behind contemporary armed conflicts. 44 To be sure, economic factors have also featured in older literature that highlighted socio-economic marginalisation as a cause of civil wars. 45 Yet, to Edward Azar this is only part of the equation as the 'real sources of conflict-as distinct from features-are deep-rooted in the lives and ontological beings of those concerned'. 46 For him, key to understanding why men take up arms against their government is identity and particularly the 'denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process' . 47 By contrast, post-Cold War scholars have increasingly viewed rebel groups as war entrepreneurs and depicted their political agendas as little more than smokescreens for opportunistic rent-seeking. 48 Since then Paul Collier's famous proposition that presentday insurgency is motivated by economic 'greed' rather than political grievances, 49 has been criticised on theoretical, methodological and normative grounds. 50 While this article cannot dwell at length upon this debate, it is important to note that more recent The focus on political economy has also impacted on the scholarship and practice of conflict resolution. The development of the so-called spoiler concept is particularly telling.
Originally proposed by Stephen Stedman, spoilers attempt to sabotage peace negotiations for their own self-interest. 53 With the increasing popularity of economistic explanations for violence, spoilers have also become understood as having vested interests in maintaining their assets in war economies. 54 Scholars have since asked how peace can come about if conflict is so profitable. One seemingly obvious answer is to buy 'greedy' spoilers off with economic incentives. 55 Comparative studies show that negotiated settlements in civil wars indeed often involve the selective economic co-optation of different warring factions. 56 According to Le Billon, members of the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia have even lost interest in their insurgency altogether after being granted lucrative teak concessions. 57 Yet, in other cases, similar approaches turned out to be more problematic. In an attempt to appease the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra
Leone-which was viewed as being largely motivated by profiting from so-called 'blood diamonds'-the Lomé Peace Accord offered rebel leaders government positions that conceded to them official control of the country's mineral resources. Yet, the accord broke down soon after, mainly as it failed to appreciate diverse motivations or institutionalise other mechanisms of power-sharing. 58 While it can be doubted that counter-insurgency in Myanmar is informed by Western theories of armed conflict, political economy scholars have referred to the business elements of the country's ceasefires to exemplify how economic interests can be harnessed for conflict resolution. 59 Yet, Sherman also warned about the pitfalls of 'a rough and ready peace through economic incentives' 60 in his assessment of the situation in the early 2000s:
[A]greements reached on the basis of economic interests do not lead to sustainable peace because they fail to address the root causes of conflict.
As Burma also shows, such cease-fire deals encourage corruption and 
From rebels to businessmen and back
Charles Tilly long ago argued that 'coherent, durable, self-propelling social unitsmonads-occupy a great deal of political theory but none of political reality'. 63 Scholarship on armed groups is no exception. On the contrary, Stathis Kalyvas has pointed out that political scientists 'often conceptualize non-state political factions involved in civil wars as monolithic actors'. 64 By so doing it is often assumed that rebel movements act according to a unified strategic rationale aimed at maximising their perceived utility vis-à-vis the state. 65 Yet, Kalyvas shows that civil wars are not 'binary conflicts' 66 organised around a 'master cleavage'. 67 Their logic is also driven by private interests and local power struggles.
These ambiguities are obscured by the conventional birds-eye view.
A young body of literature has started to explore power dynamics within insurgency by conceptualising rebel groups as heterogeneous movements. 68 According to this understanding, differently situated actors form malleable alliances, fragment into factions along various fault lines and wield different sources of authority corresponding to their location within a fluid network of power. These internal cleavages entail contestation for leadership between rival factions which, in turn, develops a momentum of its own in driving armed group behaviour. Wendy Pearlman's work shows that this can lead to negotiation or spoiling strategies that-while suboptimal from an external utility perspective-can be rational for forwarding internal power interests. 69 Cunningham et al.
agree that individual rebel factions struggle for leadership against each other. Yet, they
Ashes of co-optation 9 stress that this happens simultaneously to their contest with the state. While insurgents engage in the first competition of this 'dual contest' to increase their own faction's political power and material gains, they contend in the latter to gain benefits for the movement as a whole. Their findings support the argument that although the conflict behaviour of individual rebel factions might often seem to be at odds with their preferences in the wider struggle with the state, it can be perfectly consistent with their internal struggle for power. 70 In hence, power can wither away as well. 75 The case of the KIO helps to illustrate these processes.
Group fragmentation
While rebel groups are inherently heterogeneous movements, various military, political and economic factors can further impact on group cohesion and potentially lead to infighting. 76 Economic counter-insurgency in Kachin State had exactly these effects. In an interview a current KIO leader admits that during the ceasefire 'the government gave a lot of business opportunities to the armed groups and some leaders made a lot of benefits Infrastructure for resource deals and taxing the rapidly expanding ceasefire economy was instrumental in funding the KIO and its developmental ambitions after the ceasefire. 85 The KIO has, however, long engaged in various economic activities on the MyanmarChinese border to fund its insurgency. Historically most revenues stemmed from petty jade mining and small commodity smuggling. 86 Yet, the end of fighting in 1994 stabilised the area to an extent that enabled Chinese, Myanmar and Kachin companies to exploit
Ashes of co-optation 11 natural resources on an unprecedented scale and at an unprecedented pace. 87 While the Myanmar government has gradually taken control of the most profitable mining chunks in the region since the early 1990s-including the infamous jade mines of Hpakant-the KIO has become more reliant on timber logging. 88 This became additionally attractive as a result of rising prices paid by Chinese consumers due to a newly imposed logging ban in China. 89 After the ceasefire in 1994 Chinese companies also started large-scale hydraulic gold mining-mostly along the river banks of the Irrawaddy River and its two tributaries, the Mali and N'mai. Taxing gold mine operators has since provided the KIO with additional income. 
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The next section will show how corruption and infighting discredited KIO leaders among local communities. Together with a highly uneven distribution of burdens and benefits from extractive industries, this gave rise to new grievances in the area. This time, however, the resentments were not directed against Myanmar's generals but against the KIO leadership itself, which eroded the movement's legitimacy.
Eroding legitimacy
Legitimacy is key for leaders of popular insurgency in their quest for support from local communities and from their own rank and file. Fulfilling their side of the informal social contract between rebels and inhabitants of rebel territory is, hence, crucial for rebel leaders to maintain authority and ultimately power. 95 The new prospects for increased security and welfare initially had the potential to benefit the standing of KIO leaders after the ceasefire. In 1994 many Kachin civilians indeed felt optimistic that their insecure and impoverished circumstances would improve after decades of brutal civil war. 96 To be sure, the end of fighting removed the most significant sources of insecurity. The developmental agenda of the KIO contributed to increased access to education, health and electricity in their administered areas. 97 Moreover, incoming investments and better transport links made many towns of Kachin state modestly prosperous. 98 Despite these tangible benefits, many ordinary Kachin today feel as if their socio-economic lots as well as their security situations have not significantly improved since 1994. This is mostly due to the large-scale unsustainable resource exploitation, unleashed after the ceasefire, the environmental impacts of whichincluding deforestation and water pollution-squeezed the livelihoods of many local subsistence farmers. 99 In addition to the environmental costs, the ceasefire economies brought about new social problems. With the 1990s ceasefire the narcotics industry in northern Myanmar has become de facto tolerated. 100 Although the KIO itself officially stopped growing poppy in 1991, drugs in Kachin State have since become cheaper and more readily available.
101
Droves of migrant workers flocking to the region's extractive industries and a subsequent
Ashes of co-optation 13 rise in prostitution in combination with spiralling heroin consumption led to a HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kachin State. 102 This has had a particularly severe impact on the Kachin youth. 103 A local priest in Laiza explains that these detrimental impacts of the ceasefire economies have eroded the legitimacy of the KIO among local communities. According to him, continued impoverishment of local communities at a time when KIO leaders grew rich led to a situation where many former supporters 'didn't accept the KIO as their representative anymore'.
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Besides socio-economic problems, the militarised character of the ceasefire economies perpetuated everyday insecurities for the ordinary Kachin despite the cessation of fighting.
In a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) a father of five tells that his family had to flee four times from the Tatmadaw during the last 20 years, which two of his sons did not
survive: 'Now we ended up here because of the war. But before that we had to leave because the companies and Burmese soldiers took our land for doing business'. 105 Some of these business-related land grabs and displacements are well documented by local rights activists. 106 The Tatmadaw This became a dilemma and weakened the KIO. Within the ceasefire it was very difficult for the KIO to manoeuvre between the government and the civilians.
They were trying to get trust from the civilian side but also not to break down the ceasefire with the government. [ . . . ] From the civilians' view, the KIO sometimes even looked like a government agency.
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During an informal talk a senior officer of the movement's armed wing-the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)-admits that among the biggest problems arising from this situation, indeed, was that 'we could not provide security for the public. We simply had no power to protect them'. 109 According to the local priest in Laiza, this lack of protection, coupled with the KIO's own complicity in these destructive industries, was among the major reasons why 'people became very disillusioned about the KIO and thought it lost its revolutionary goals' .
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Rebuilding the movement Asked about these days, one of the co-founders of this internal opposition explains:
There was a gap between old officers and young officers, their ideas and many other things [ . . . ]. For example, the old men acted just like Burmese soldiers, they wanted to control everything. They wanted to control the organisation and make profit. But the young officers wanted to change that behaviour.
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The widespread grievances among their foot soldiers and ordinary Kachin-which were directed against the KIO's top leadership-provided the young officers with a fertile 
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Conclusion
Insurgency consists of differently situated and motivated elite and non-elite actors.
It does not emerge out of the blue and cannot operate in insolation from local communities. In fact, legitimacy and support are crucial for waging successful guerrilla warfare. The central argument behind this conceptualisation of insurgency is that armed group behaviour is not the result of strategic rationalising by a unified leadership but the result of complex social interactions. This explains why tweaking the external economic incentive structure of rebellion might serve to selectively co-opt rebel leaders. At the same time, however, it can also fragment movements and erode legitimacy, which might well spark new sites of internal contestation and reinforce armed group resistance over time.
This article has demonstrated these processes with the case of the KIO, arguing that the 17-year-long ceasefire was only a fac ade of stability, which contained within itself the 
